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CoNsnTUTioNAL LA.w-CoMMERCE CLAusE--STATE TAXAnoN OF CoM-

MERCE-Plaintiff, a Massauchusetts manufacturing corporation operating on a
mail order-f.o.b. delivery basis, maintained a branch office and warehouse in
Chicago. While some over-the-counter sales were consummated' in Chicago,
this office acted mainly as a headquarters for an engineering staff maintained
as a service to customers, and as a conduit for orders placed by Illinois customers
with the company. Orders received at the branch office were forwarded to
Massachusetts for acceptance or rejection, and some filled orders were shipped
to customers by way of the local outlet as a means of reducing freight costs.
Although the Chicago office did not solicit orders, and often had no connection
whatsoever with sales made by the home office to Illinois customers, the plaintiff
was compelled to pay, under protest, a state occupation tax measured by the
entire gross receipts of the company from sales to persons in the state. On certiorari from the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court upholding the tax over
federal constitutional objections,1 held, that sales channeled through the local
office are taxable, but transactions directly between the home office and Illinois
customers are interstate sales beyond the taxing power of the state.2 Norton Co.
v. Dept. of Revenue of Illinois, 340 U.S. 534, 71 S. Ct. 377 (1951).
The commerce clause operates to protect interstate shipments from discriminatory3 or unduly burdensome4 taxation by the states, but it does not render
such goods completely immune from local revenue-raising devices. It is reasonably clear that the interstate transaction itself cannot be taxed;5 however, a
local incident or separate component part of the entire transaction is taxable. 6

Norton Co. v. Dept. of Rev. of Ill., 405 Ill. 314, 90 N.E. (2d) 737 (1950).
Justice Reed would have immunized sales resulting from orders forwarded to Massachusetts by the Chicago office where shipment was made directly to the customer, while
Justices Clark, Black, and Douglas contended that all sales, whether channeled through the
Chicago branch or made directly with the company in Massachusetts, made to Illinois customers should be taxable. See dissenting opinions in the principal case, 340 U.S. 534 at
539-541 (1951).
a Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 59 S.Ct. 325 (1939); Best &
Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 61 S.Ct. 334 (1940); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal
Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 at 45, 60 S.Ct. 388 (1940).
4 Interstate Buses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245 at 251, 48 S.Ct. 230 (1927); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., supra note 3. .
5 Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1, 54 S.Ct. 34 (1933).
6 Gwin, White & Prince_ v. Henneford, supra note 3.
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The rationale of such a distinction is two-fold: (1) a state has no power to tax
activities which take place completely outside of its borders,7 and (2) interstate
commerce cannot be compelled to submit to the possible burden of multiple
state taxes on the same transaction. 8 Where :r;ieither of these objections is present, the tax has a valid jurisdictional basis,9 although it may be vulnerable on
other grounds.10 In line with these general principles, a sales tax may be imposed only by the state in which the actual transfer of title or possession takes
place. 11 Likewise, a tax measured by the gross receipts derived from such sales
must not encompass out-of-state or interstate activities. 12 Locally produced
revenues are taxable, but revenues of other branches of the same company in
other states may not be included for local tax purposes. 13 The exact dividing
line between the permissive tax and the prohibited one is by no means clear,
however, despite the gradual process of judicial delimitation. It is well established that the sale of goods through local retail outlets or salesmen is a separate local taxable incident, even though the goods are shipped in interstate
commerce;14 while on the other hand, mere local solicitation of orders, either
by advertising or through personal representatives, does not bring the out-ofstate sale within the local tax orbit.15 Where other elements are added, or
where the two types of operations are combined, the tax consequences become
more hazy. The principal case falls in this area. Conceding that the maintenance of either an office or a sales outlet within the state does not render dealings directly between the purchaser and an out-of-state office taxable,16 the
Court indicates that where the local office operates in the dual capacity of an
in-state seller and an agency for handling orders filled outside the state, the
receipts from all such sales are attributable to the local outlet, and are taxable
7 Ott v. Mississippi Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 at 174, 69 S.Ct. 432 (1949);
separate opinion of Rutledge in McLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U.S. 327 at 349, 64 S.Ct. 1023
(1944); Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, supra note 3 at 438-9, 59 S.Ct. 325 (1939).
It should be noted that this is really a due process requirement rather than one resulting
from the commerce clause, although the two overlap.
s Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, supra note 3; Adams Manufacturing Co. v.
Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 58 S.Ct. 913 (1937).
9 The due process clause requires that the state have some basis for exerting its power
over the property or activity sought to be taxed. See note 7, and also MAHANY, CoMMBRCE
CLAUSB TAX PROBLEMS, c. 1 (1940).
10 A tax may be invalid because of procedural defects, a violation of statutory or other
constitutional limitations, or an abuse of power, even though it has a valid jurisdictional
basis.
11 McLeod v. Dilworth Co., supra note 7.
12 Minnesota v. Blasius, supra note 5; McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co.,
supra note 3 at 62 in the dissenting opinion; Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 67 S.Ct.
274 (1946).
13 Comm. of Corp. & Taxation v. Ford Motor Co., 308 Mass. 558, 33 N.E. (2d) 318
(1941); Cooney v. Mountain States Telegraph Co., 294 U.S. 384, 55 S.Ct. 477 (1935).
14 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., supra note 3; McGoldrick v. Felt
and Tarrant Manufacturing Co., 309 U.S. 70, 60 S.Ct. 404 (1940).
15 McLeod v. Dilworth Co., supra note 7; Cheney Bros. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S.
147, 38 S.Ct. 295 (1918).
16 Cooney v. Mountain States Telegraph Co., 294 U.S. 384, 55 S.Ct. 477 (1935);
Cheney Bros. v. Massachusetts, supra note 15.
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as such. Prior decisions had indicated that where goods are shipped to the customer by way of a local office, the sale is taxable, since title and possession do
not pass to the purchaser until actual delivery is made to him.17 However, the
ruling that the mere forwarding of orders to the home office for fulfillment is
sufficient to bring the transaction within the reach of the state represents a
departure from the situs-of-transfer test formerly adhered to. The reasoning
of the Court is that the presence of the local office contributes in some measure to the sale, both in the customer's mind and in actual fact, as evidenced by
the initial placement of the order with it, and it thereupon becomes the duty
of the company to prove that such sales are not attributable to the branch outlet if it wishes to escape tax liability. 1'.his seems to indicate that the real basis
of the distinction drawn between direct sales and those passing through the
local outlet is in the burden of proof, the presumption being that channeled sales
are related to the intrastate business, while direct sales are not.18 The exact
breadth of this doctrine must be left to future judicial determinations, with the
mail-order vendor merely on warning that channeled sales may involve local
tax liability.

Allan Neef, S.Ed.

17 McGoldrick v. Felt and Tarrant Manufacturing Co., supra note 14; McGoldrick v.
DuGrenier, Inc., 309 U.S. 70, 60 S.Ct. 404 (1940).
18 It should be noted that the difficulties of proof make these burdens practically conclusive presumptions in effect.

